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FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
REQUIREMENTS OTHER THAN NEPA: 
THE EMERGING CHALLENGE 
RoNALD H. RosENBERG 0 AND ALLEN H. 0LSON° 0 
T HE PASSAGE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT of 19691 has been heralded as a dramatic modification of federal agency decision-making. 
The Act, commonly called NEPA, had three major objectives. First, it 
established a government-wide obligation to include environmental factors in 
the activities of federal agencies. 2 Second, it created the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to serve as an advisor to the President on 
environmental issues.3 And third, it mandated a comprehensive environmen-
tal review of all "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment."4 The required environmental review quickly assumed 
the form of the Environmental Impact Statement or EIS. Prompted by 
judicial interpretation and guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental 
Quality ,5 federal agencies in the early 1970's began to prepare EIS' son a wide 
variety of federal, federally-assisted and federally-licensed activities.6 For 
example, Army Corps of Engineer dams, Department of Transportation-
funded highway projects, Environmental Protection Agency-assisted waste-
water treatment plants fell within NEPA's broad scope. 
Compliance with NEPA did not come easily. Many agencies viewed the 
NEPA requirements merely as burdensome paperwork without substantive 
importance. Most federal agencies eventually realized after a considerable 
body of federal court decisions were handed down, that good-faith 
compliance with the Act, rather than continued litigation and project delays, 
would better serve their agency purposes in the long term.7 Consequently, as 
o B.A., Columbia University; M.R.P., University of North Carolina; J.D. with honors, 
University of North Carolina; Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 
Cleveland State University. The author is grateful to the Cleveland-Marshall Fund for its support 
throughout the preparation of this paper. 
o o B.A., Cornell University; J.D., University of North Carolina; formerly Attorney/ Advisor, 
Construction Grants Div., Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.; presently in 
private practice in Warrenton, Va. and a consultant to the Council on Environmental Quality. 
1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,83 Stat. 852 (1969) (current 
version at 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976)). 
2 National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). 
3 National Environmental Policy Act§§ 202-204, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-4344 (1976). 
4 National Environmental Policy Act§ l02(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). 
5 CEQ Guidelines on Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 40 C.F.R. § 1500 
(1977). The Council on Environmental Quality recently proposed comprehensive amendments 
to their Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 25230-47 (1978). These proposed regulations address the issue of 
duplicative environmental review requirements and seek, in a general way, to streamline the 
federal review process. See also note 12 infra. 
6 See generally, F. ANDERSON & R. DANIELS, NEPA IN THE CouRTS (1973); Anderson, The 
National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL Environmental Law 238. (E.L. Dolgin & T.G.P. 
Guilbert eds. 197 4). 
7 See generally, Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL Environmen-
tal Law 238 (E.L. Dolgin & T.C.P. Guilbert eds. 1974). 
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the decade progressed, EIS's were prepared on an increasing number of 
federal activities. In addition, many agencies implemented policies which 
required an environmental assessment or report to be prepared on all agency 
projects and programs whether or not an EIS was required.8 Usually these 
assessments and reports served as the basis for decisions on whether the 
activity required a full EIS. For projects not constituting a "major federal 
action" or not "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 
the assessment was often utilized as a sub-NEPA environmental planning 
document. 
It can be argued that the development of environmental planning 
capabilities and concern has been NEPA's greatest accomplishment. 
Enlightened federal agencies no longer see NEPA solely as a statutory 
paperwork requirement which must be satisfied before an activity may 
proceed. More importantly, NEPA represents a planning process which 
allows environmental considerations to be given at least some weight with 
technical and economic factors in the development of federal program 
actions and altematives.9 
NEPA, however, is not the only federal environmental review statute to be 
found in the United States Code. The concept of a comprehensive review 
process under NEPA is complicated by the existence of over 30 other federal 
statutes which impose environmental requirements upon federal activities. 10 
s For example, the Environmental Protection Agency requires an environmental assessment 
of its sewage treatment plant construction projects whether or not a full NEPA-mandated 
environmental impact statement will ultimately be necessary. See, 43 Fed. Reg. 44064 (1978) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 35.925-8). 
9 One recent commentary, however, has indicated a rejection of the commonly held premise 
that NEPA has "brought of a new day in responsible agency decision-making" and has 
constituted an important "action forcing" mechanism resulting in environmentally beneficial 
federal actions. See, Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement, 199 SCIENCE 743 (1978). 
Professor Fairfax writes: 
I d. 
I suggest that NEPA does not constitute a new approach to administrative •eform and is 
actually a poor vehicle for a reformation of agency decision-making. Litigation under 
NEPA and preoccupation with the NEPA process truncated pre-existing and potentially 
significant developments in the definition of agency responsibility for environmental 
protection and in citizen involvement in agency deliberative processes. It turned 
environmentalists' efforts away from questioning and redefining agencies' powers and 
responsibilities and focused them instead on analyzing documents. This preoccupation 
has led to a misallocation of the environmental movement's resources. 
10 16 U .S.C. § 20 (1976); Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, as amended, 49 U .S.C. 
§ 1716 (1976); Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7l9-7l9o (1976); 
Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, as amended, 16 U .S.C.§§ 757a-757f (1976); Bald and Golden 
Eagle Protection Act, as amended, 16 U .S.C.§§ 668-668d (1976); Classification and Multiple Use 
Act of 1964,43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1976); Clean Air Act ofl970,asamended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-
1858a (1976); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976); 
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U .S.C.§§ 1501-1524 (1976); Department of Transportation Act of 
1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976); Department of Transportation Actofl966, as amended, 49 U .S.C.§ 
1653(f) (1976); Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976); 
Energy Conservation and Production Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976); Energy 
Conservation in Existing Buildings Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6851-6892 (1976); Energy 
Conservation Standards for New Buildings Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6831-6840 (1976); Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976); Energy Supply and Environmental 
Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-798 (1976); Estuarine Areas Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-
1226 (1976); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 109, § 128, § 138 (1976); 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976); Federal Coal Leasing 
Amendments Act of 1975, 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1976); Federal Energy Administration Act of 
1978] FEDERALENVIRONMENTALREVIEW 197 
NEPA can be distinguished from these other statutes since it requires a 
comprehensive examination of the impact of a federal activity upon all 
aspects of the environment while most of the other federal environmental 
review statutes are directed at a single environmental medium or concern 
(i.e., air, water, wildlife habitat, endangered species). Environmental review 
requirements in each of these statutes and the executive orders issued 
pursuant to them place additional responsibilities on federal agencies 
beyond those already imposed by NEPA. These provisions impose what 
can be generally described as specialized environmental review re-
quirements. As will be shown, compliance with NEPA, even to the extent of 
preparation of a full EIS, will not necessarily satisfy these specialized statutes. 
In addition, these requirements are implemented by separate procedural 
regulations; each statute may have its own regulation. The CEQ environmen-
tal impact statement guidelines and individual agency NEPA regulations, at 
best, can only partially satisfy any of the specialized statutes. Separate 
documents are in many cases needed to comply with each statute. 
Many of the specialized review statutes require "consultation" or 
"coordination" with the federal agency administering that law.U Review 
statutes are administered by several different federal agencies thus requiring 
many federal activities to go through a number of consultations. Some of the 
specialized statutes impose substantive as well as procedural requirements. 
These statutory requirements may govern the final disposition of the federal 
activity as well as the review procedures that must be followed in the decision 
making process. Other requirements are purely procedural and thus more 
akin to the NEPA requirements. 
The aggressiveness with which these statutes and orders have been 
implemented in the past has varied markedly. Some have been recognized by 
197 4, as amended, 15 U.S. C. § § 761-790h ( 1976); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide 
Act, as amended, 7 U .S.C. §§ 121-136y (1976); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251-1376 (1976); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of March 10, 1934, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 661-666c (1976); Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, as 
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976); Fur Seal Act of 1966, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ ll51-
ll86 (1976); Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-469i 
(1976); Land and Water Conservation Act of 1965, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 460 (1976); Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as amended, 16 U .S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976); Marine Protection, 
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-
1434 (1976); Materials Act of 1947, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 601 (1976); Mineral Leasing Act for 
Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-353 (1976); MineraiLeasingActof 1920, as amended, 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 181, 182, 185 (1976); Mining Law of 1872, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976); Multiple Use-
Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U .S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976); National Historic Preservation Act of 
1966, as amended, 16 U .S.C.§ 470 (1976); National Park System Mining Regulation Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1901-1912 (1976); Noise Control Act of 1972,42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976); Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976); Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
6901-6987 (1976}; Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, as amended, 33 U .S.C.§§ 401-
466n (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-9 (1976}; Solid Waste Disposal Act, 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976); TaylorGrazingActofl934,asamended,43 U.S.C. §§ 
315, 315a, 315e, 315f (1976}; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); Trans-
Alaska PipelineAuthorizationAct,43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1976); Urban Mass Transportation Act 
of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1602, § 1610 (1976); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, as amended, 16 
U.S.C. ~§ 1271-1287 (1976); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ ll31-ll36 (1976). 
11 See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U .S.C. § 661 (1976), and National Historic 
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976). 
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federal agencies for a number of years. Others, although legally binding, have 
been actively enforced only in recent years. The reasons for this uneven 
treatment are numerous. Administering agencies have in some cases not had 
sufficient resources to implement their statutes. Also, the applicability of 
certain of the requirements to different types of federal activities has been 
disputed. Some environmental review requirements have until recently 
simply been ignored by the government, interest groups and the public. 
To date the courts have played only a limited role in assuring compliance 
with the specialized review laws. The most recent statutes have had very little 
judicial interpretation. Other statutes have been briefly discussed in decisions 
which rely primarily on NEPA requirements. Unfortunately these decisions 
tend to confuse the specialized review requirements more than clarify them. 
Within the last several years, however, courts have begun to pay more 
attention to the specialized statutes in their own right. This has been prompted 
in part by increased interest in these laws by environmental organizations and 
other interest groups. In some cases, having failed to stop or modify a federal 
project on NEPA grounds, environmental litigants have turned to the 
specialized statutes for help. Environmental groups have also used these laws 
to influence federal agencies' decision-making in administrative proceedings. 
Thus, these requirements have had an impact in situations short of actual 
litigation. 
The effect of specialized environmental review statutes on federal 
activities will continue to grow. Their increasing importance and their 
tendency to overlap NEPA, and occasionally each other, will certainly 
complicate federal environmental review and planning processes. Although 
there are several ongoing efforts to streamline the procedures generated by 
these statutes, 12 government officials, planners, lawyers and others will 
undoubtedly have to live with the present framework for at least the near 
future. With that premise in mind, this article will analyze five major 
specialized environmental review statutes which affect the greatest number of 
federal activities, including 1) the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 
1958;13 2) the Endangered Species Act of 1973;14 3) the National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966;15 4) the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1974;16 5) the 
12 President Carter, in his May 23, 1977 Environmental Message to Congress, stated: 
Today, before any federal agency can construct a new project, or grant funds to local 
or state governments, or issue a permit to a private party, it must comply with more than 
a score of different environmental review requirements. I have directed the Council on 
Environmental Quality to examine the present federal environmental review 
requirements and to recommend specific measures, including legislation, to clarify and 
integrate them in a way compatible with my broader proposals for governmental 
reorganization. 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 794 (May 23, 1977). 
The study requested by the President is now underway at CEQ. The study will hopefully 
resolve some of the issues raised in this article. To assist this effort, the Council on Environmental 
Quality has recently issued a new NEPA regulation to replace the previous NEPA guidelines. 43 
Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978). The regulation was mandated by Executive Order 11991 issued by 
President Carter on May 24, 1977. 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 808 (May 24, 1977). 
13 16 u.s.c. § 661 (1976). 
14 16 u.s.c. § 1531 (1976). 
15 16 u.s.c. § 470 (1976). 
16 16 u.s.c. § 1274 (1976). 
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Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,17 and will evaluate their existing 
judicial interpretations, identify emerging trends in the law, highlight the 
problems that have arisen owing to the proliferation of environmental statutes 
and finally offer suggestions for the future. 
I. FISH AND WILDLIFE CooRDINATION Acr 
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA} 18 is one of the oldest 
federal environmental review statutes. The Act was originally passed in 193419 
and amended in 1946,20 in 195821 and again in 1965.22 It has had a substantial 
impact on the planning and development of certain types of federal projects, 
particularly U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dam projects and other major 
federal construction activities directly affecting navigable waters. The effect 
of the Act on other types of federal activities has varied significantly. This is 
due to a number of factors including: 1) lack of resom~es in the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS},23 2) legal questions on the applicability of the Act to 
certain types of federal activities, 3) recalcitrance on the part of certain 
federal agencies to comply with the law, and 4) the passage of NEPA which 
has, in part, overshadowed the Act. 
The environmental review requirements of the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act are found in section 662(a}. 24 This section provides in part 
that: 
. . . whenever the waters of any stream or other body of water 
are proposed or authorized to be impounded, diverted, the channel 
deepened, or the stream or other body of water otherwise controlled 
or modified for any purpose whatever, including navigation and 
drainage by any department or agency of the United States, or by 
any public or private agency under Federal permit or license, such 
department or agency first shall consult with the United States Fish 
and Wildlife Service . . . with a view to the conservation of 
wildlife resources by preventing loss of and damage to such 
resources as well as providing for the development and improve-
ment thereof in connection with such water resource development. 
(emphasis supplied). 25 
In addition, section 662(b) further requires that the reports and 
17 16 u.s.c. §1451 (1976). 
"16 u.s.c. § 661 (1976). 
'"Act of March 10, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 401 (1934). 
20 Act of August 14, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-732, 60 Stat. 1080 (1934). 
21 Act of August 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 563 (1958). 
22 Act of July 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-72, 79 Stat. 213 (1965). 
2
'
1 Possibly the most serious problem confronting the administration of the Act has been a lack 
of resources on the part of the Fish and Wildlife Service. This has restricted the Service's ability to 
provide the technical expertise needed to adequately review the increasing number of federal 
activities subject to the Act. In many cases, the Service has simply declined to review projects for 
this reason. See, e.g., Sun Industries Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976). 
24 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976). 
2
-' ld. 
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recommendations of the Secretary of Interior on "the wildlife aspects of such 
projects" be made an integral part of all federal agency reports submitted for 
congressional authorization or administrative approval of water resource 
projects.26 The reports of the Secretary under the Act must include proposed 
measures for mitigating or compensating damage to wildlife resources 
resulting from the project. Furthermore, the federal agency proposing the 
project is required to "give full consideration to the report and recommen-
dations" of the Secretary and to include in project plans "such justifiable 
means and measures for wildlife purposes as the reporting agency finds 
should be adopted to obtain maximum overall project benefits."27 
Despite being on the statute books for over forty years, no comprehensive 
regulation has ever been promulgated setting forth procedures for complying 
with the consultation and reporting requirements of the Act. Procedural 
details have been left to interagency agreements, project agency regulations, 
and program guidance documents issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service. 
There have been many recent recommendations, including one from the 
President's Council on Environmental Quality, that the FWS develop such a 
regulation to put uniformity into the Act's implementation.28 
The environmental review provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act have not received extensive judicial review. With the enactment of 
NEPA, FWCA issues have gradually been subsumed in the cases which 
examine the procedural or substantive adequacy of environmental impact 
statements. This is contrary to the trend seen recently in the courts giving 
independent status to other environmental review statutes. 29 However, a brief 
analysis of the Act's case law history reveals several important points which 
shed some light on the future of these provisions. 
First, from the standpoint of the private litigant, there is serious question 
whether such a party may bring suit under section 662 to require interagency 
consultation. An early decision, Rank v. Krug,30 stated that citizens could not 
force compliance with this duty since it "is lodged with regularly selected 
officials whose duties are clearly defined by statute, any more than a private 
citizen could step in and assun :e the duties of prosecuting attorney or 
govemor."31 Although this sentiment seems out of place at a time when there is 
substantial citizen enforcement of governmental environmental obligations, 
it has been reiterated in a number of recent federal court decisions.32 In the 
26 16 U.S.C. § 662(b) (1976). 
27 ld. 
2
' On March 16, 1978, the Council on Environmental Quality issued a memorandum entitled 
"Draft recommendations of the Council on Environmental Quality on measures to simplify, 
coordinate and codify federal wildlife law" (on file at office of Cleveland State Law Review). 
One of the CEQ proposals in this document was that "a single set of procedural regulations 
implementing the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and binding all federal agencies, should be 
promulgated after full participation by relevant federal and state agencies and other interested 
parties." To date no final action has been taken by Interior or the Corps on either the NWF 
petition or the CEQ recommendation. 
29 See text accompanying note 1, supra, passim. 
30 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950). 
31 Id. at 801. 
32 See, Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
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most recent of these cases, County of Trinity v. Andrus,33 the district court 
flatly held that "no private right of action arises under" the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act.34 This attitude may reflect the judicial opinion that the 
consultation and reporting requirements of the FWCA can be satisfied by a 
procedurally and substantively adequate environmental impact statement. 
Such a view destroys the independent vitality of the FWCA and effectively 
reduces its section 662(a) and (b) requirements to "include" components of an 
EIS. 
Another line of cases indicates support for the view that compliance with 
NEPA serves to satisfy the FWCA requirements. Two early cases, Zabel v. 
Tabb35 and Akers v. Resor,36 appeared to reflect an interest in reconciling the 
two statutes and giving them both recognition. However, cases following 
Zabel and Akers have been structured in a way to give NEP A claims primary 
emphasis.37 For example, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of 
Engineers,38 the court found that good faith compliance with NEPA 
automatically constituted compliance with the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act. This result does not clarify the relationship between the two statutes. 
It may be best explained by the fact that the NEPA environmental impact 
statement was viewed as the forum for raising all environmental concerns. 
However, as will be seen, the recent United States Supreme Court decision of 
TVA v. Hill 39 appears to cast doubt on such a result since the Court in that case 
applied the requirements of another specialized environmental review 
statute, the Endangered Species Act, in such a way to give it independent 
significance apart from NEPA. 
Additionally courts have ignored the specific procedural consultation 
requirements imposed by section 662(a) of the FWCA and also the section 
662(b) reporting obligation of the Department of the Interior. Instead, 
judicial review has focused upon the environmental impact statement to 
determine if there has been a departure "from the Congressional intent or 
policies of (the FWCA ]."4° Consequently the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act issue has been reduced merely to a component of the court's EIS analysis. 
Too often the only question raised is whether the EIS mentioned the fish and 
wildlife impacts of the proposed project. With that issue resolved in the 
affirmative, challenges based upon the FWCA have been dismissed. In Save 
Our Invaluable Land (SOIL) Inc. v. Needham, 41 reviewing the adequacy of 
an Army Corps of Engineers EIS for a dam project, the Tenth Circuit 
eliminated the FWCA-based claim by summarily stating that, "(l]n preparing 
33 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977). 
34 Id. at 1383. 
35 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 
36 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.O. Tenn. 1972). 
37 Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.O. Va.), aff'd 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, aff' d 470 F.2d 289 
(8th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Save our 
Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 387 F. Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1974). 
'" 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
39 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 74-89 infra. 
4° Cape Henry BirdCiubv. Laird,359F.Supp.404, 418 (W.O. Va.1973). 
41 542 F.2d 539 (lOth Cir. 1976). 
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its EIS the Corps did not ignore the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 
1958"42 (emphasis supplied). 
Drawing from these recent cases it seems apparent that specific 
procedural and substantive requirements of the FWCA have not been 
independently considered by courts in the context of EIS review. The courts 
have conceived of the FWCA as a restatement of the NEPA obligations to 
consider wildlife impacts in an environmental impact statement. An EIS 
which discusses wildlife effects will often be found to "satisfy" the FWCA in a 
vague, non-specific way. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of 
Engineers,43 Judge Eisele went so far as to say it would be unreasonable to 
require the Corps to comply with NEPA and the FWCA separately. Such a 
statement reflects the judicial perception that NEPA and the FWCA are 
overlapping statutes covering the same concerns, and that, since the NEPA-
mandated EIS is required to be a comprehensive appraisal of all 
environmental effects of a project, it will suffice to satisfy the FWCA 
obligations. 
The position that satisfaction of the NEPA EIS requirement also satisfies 
the FWCA is incorrect for a number of reasons. (l) The FWCA imposes 
specific procedural and substantive requirements different from those of 
NEPA. There is no reason why these obligations of currently applicable 
federal law should not be given full force and effect. (2) Even if the NEPA 
environmental impact statement is to be considered the proper procedural 
"vehicle" for complying with the FWCA, there might be an inadequate form 
of judicial review then applied to the substantive elements of theW ildlife Act. 
It is not yet settled whether or not NEPA mandates substantive review of 
agency decisions. 44 If an EIS is examined to determine FWCA compliance 
without regard to the specific requirments of the FWCA, then these 
substantive concerns could be entirely outside the scope of judicial review. (3) 
The FWCA contains consultation and evaluation procedures which should be 
integrated into agency project planning at an early stage. Since Congress has 
specifically recognized fish and wildlife interests as deserving of special 
consideration, the role of the Department of Interior should not be reduced to 
merely commenting on another agency's draft and final environmental 
impact statements. If Congress wished to repeal the requirements of the 
FWCA, it could do so. As yet, it has not taken such action. 
A recent Second Circuit decision has recognized the importance of the 
FWCA section 662(a) interagency consultation requirements. In Sun 
Industries Ltd. v. Train,45 the plaintiff challenged the issuance by the 
Environmental Protection Agency of a National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit to a sewage treatment facility on the 
grounds that EPA had not satisfied the FWCA. EPA had sent its draft permit 
to the Department of the Interior for the necessary consultation consisting of 
review and comment. It received in return a statement of "no action" by 
Interior attributable to insufficient funding and personnel in its Fish and 
42 I d. at 543. 
43 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
44 W. RoDGERS, ENviRONMENTAL LAw 741 at n.23 (1977). 
45 394 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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Wildlife Service. Acting upon this purported waiver of the FWCA 
requirements and in conformance with its own regulations EPA issued the 
NPDES permit. Sun Enterprises then sued to challenge EPA's action. 
Although the case was resolved primarily on the issue of judicial review 
under section 509 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 46 the court did 
address the waiver attempted by the Fish and Wildlife Service. The court 
totally rejected the Interior Department's claim that it could refuse to review 
submission from other federal agencies. It found no legislative intent for such 
an abdication of responsibility and gave no support to EPA's regulations 
recognizing such a waiver. In addition, the appellate court rebuffed the 
government's defense of inadequate funding resources by noting that the 
Department of Interior had not even sought appropriations. 47 This case is 
significant because it accords the FWCA section 662(a) requirement respect 
which is notably lacking in the prior decisions discussed above. Without 
significant discussion, the court made the threshold determination that the 
section 662 requirements apply to the issuance of NPDES permits; it is 
arguable that the statutory language and intent would not call for such a 
result.48 
The court's application of the FWCA consultation requirements in the Sun 
Industries case can possibly be explained by unique provisions of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. All EPA actions under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act except for wastewater treatment grants and new source 
performance standards are specifically exempted from NEPA re-
quirements.49 Therefore, the decision to issue the NPDES permit in the Sun 
Industries case was not subject to direct EIS analysis. In this situation the court 
may have concluded that the FWCA consultation procedures were necessary 
to protect the wildlife interests in the absence of a formal EIS. It is thus unclear 
whether the position taken in Sun Industries can be considered as precedent in 
situations beyond the NPDES permitting process. Furthermore the discussion 
in Sun Industries of the FWCA issue was dicta and not basic to the decision. 
However, the Second Circuit's strong statement in Sun Industries concerning 
the importance of the FWCA consultation process does represent a 
recognition of the Act as a separate entity, worthy of independent compliance 
under a congressionally-authorized mandate. 
A separate rationale for compliance with the FWCA has emerged in the 
recent case of National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus. 5° There, the plaintiff 
organization sued to enjoin the construction of a twenty-three megawatt 
46 33 u.s.c. § 1369 (1976). 
47 532 F.2d 280, 290 n.13 (2d Cir. 1976). 
4
' Section 662(a) of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act specifically requires federal 
agencies to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and any state wildlife agency 
"whenever the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed or authorized to be 
impounded, diverted, the channel deepened, or the stream or other body of water otherwise 
controlled or modified for any purpose whatever .... "(emphasis added).16 U.S.C. § 662(a) 
(1976). The district court had found that EPA's NPDES permit constituted a potential stream 
modification bringing EPA under the consultation requirements of the Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act. 294 F. Supp. 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The granting of an NPDES permit might 
not necessarily be found within the breadth of this statutory section. 
4
" Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 137l(c)(1)(1976). 
50 440F. Supp.1245 (D.D.C.1977). 
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hydroelectric power plant to be built on the San Juan River in New Mexico. 
They contended that the Department of the Interior had violated, inter alia, 
section 662(b),51 requiring the Secretary of Interior to submit to Congress a 
report on the effect on wildlife of those projects upon which it has been 
consulted. In granting the injunction, the district court found two purposes 
behind section 662(b): the first being the requirement of federal agency 
consideration of environment effects in project development and the second 
being "to inform the Congress of those consequences to enable it to consider 
conservation measures."52 · 
The court then addressed the issue of whether NEPA compliance also 
constituted compliance with the FWCA. Although the EIS involved was 
found to have been insufficient, the court noted that even if a legally adequate 
environmental statement had been prepared, such action would not 
necessarily serve the FWCA-mandated function of informing Congress of the 
environmental effects of the federal projects it funds. "In such circumstances, 
strict compliance with FWCA should be required."53 This conclusion 
followed directly from the court's view that the Department of the Interior is 
to serve as an indirect advisor to Congress providing expert information on 
the wildlife impacts of federally-funded water resource projects. 
In conclusion, the limited case law interpreting the FWCA does not 
provide precise answers regarding the statute's application to the ever 
increasing number of federal activities affecting American waterways. In the 
past, the FWCA has been viewed as being superfluous when a judicially 
acceptable environmental impact statement has been prepared. However, if 
the Wildlife Federation and Sun Industries cases are indicative of the 
emerging trend, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act will be viewed by 
the federal courts as being procedurally and also substantively distinct from 
NEPA. Future cases will develop the relationship between these two 
statutes. 
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr OF 1973 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)54 is a recent addition to the list of 
specialized environmental review statutes. The key "consultation and 
coordination" section of the Act is section 7. Section 7 states that: 
The Secretary [of Interior] shall review other programs 
administered by him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the 
purposes of this Act. All other Federal departments and agencies 
shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, 
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act by 
carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species 
and threatened species listed pursuant to Section 4 of this Act and by 
51 16 u.s.c. § 662(b) (1976). 
52 440 F. Supp. 1245, 1255 (D.D.C. 1977). 
53 ld. 
54 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976), as amended by Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978). The amendments are discussed in notes 90-101, supra, and 
accompanying text. 
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taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, 
funded or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued 
existence of such endangered species and threatened species or 
result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species 
which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as 
appropriate with the affected states, to be critical.55 
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This section specifies four distinct obligations to be satisfied: (I) the Secretary 
of Interior must review and utilize existing programs to further the purposes 
of the Act; (2) all agencies must use their authority to further these same 
purposes by carrying out conservation programs; (3) all agencies must insure 
that their activities do not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered 
or threatened species; and ( 4) all agencies must insure that their actions do not 
modify or destroy critical habitats for endangered species. These obligations 
are set forth with relatively little detail thereby leaving major interpretive 
questions for the courts. Broadly interpreted, this language creates a 
substantive standard against which all federal agency activities would be 
evaluated on judicial review. 
The administration of this section of the law is divided between the 
Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the Department of Commerce. The 
FWS is responsible for the application of section 7 to the vast majority of listed 
endangered and threatened species while NMFS is responsible for a smaller 
number of marine species. 56 
Section 7 imposes a procedural consultation requirement on all federal 
agencies whose activities may threaten listed endangered species and also 
their critical habitats. The recently promulgated regulation, jointly issued by 
the NMFS and the FWS,57 as well as certain court decisions, 58 indicate that 
section 7 cannot be satisfied through compliance with NEPA. It may be 
possible for NEPA and Endangered Species Act procedure and documenta-
tion to be integrated to a limited extent. However, each statute has an 
independent legal basis, and federal agencies must assure that their activities 
meet the requirements of both. 
The section 7 procedures may tum out to be among the most complex of 
the specialized review requirements confronting federal agencies. The new 
regulations put the burden squarely on the project agency to develop the 
necessary biological information for an adequate review by the FWS or 
55 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (emphasis added). 
56 4.3 Fed. Reg. 870 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402). 
57 43 Fed. Reg. 875 (1978) (to be codi£ed in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(b) ). Section402.04(b)(1) states 
that: 
Consultation under section 7 may be consolidated with interagency cooperation re-
quired by other statutes, such as the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. § 661 
et seq.) or the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.). The satis-
faction of the requirements of these other statutes, however, does not in itself relieve 
a Federal agency of its obligation to comply with the consultation procedures set forth 
in this part. (emphasis added). 
5
' T .V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978); National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d359 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). See generally text accompanying notes 67-69 and 74-
89, infra. 
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NMFS of the impact of the activity on an endangered or threatened species. 59 
This data then serves as the basis for a biological opinion issued by FWS or 
NMFS. The biological opinion must be rendered within 60 days after a 
request for consultation from the sponsoring agency and the receipt of 
adequate biological data.60 The response period can be extended for an 
additional60 days when additional information or further review is needed. 61 
The procedure is further complicated in those instances when it must be 
determined whether critical habitat is involved. 62 The eventual listing of up to 
1700 species of endangered or threatened flora63 will undoubtedly add to the 
procedural problems and greatly increase the number of section 7 
consultations required each year. 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act potentially may make a more 
substantive impact on federal projects than NEPA. A brief review of the 
emerging case law involving section 7 will illustrate a developing pattern of 
judicial thought recognizing the significant procedural and substantive 
requirements of the ESA. 
Although the section 7 requirements were enacted into law in 1973, there 
have been surprisingly few cases arising under its authority. In one such case, 
Sierra Club v. Froehlke,64 the court was asked to enjoin an Army Corps of 
Engineers dam project located in Meramec Park, Missouri, in part because it 
was alleged that construction of the dam would jeopardize the continued 
existence of the endangered Indiana bat. It was also claimed that the reservoir 
built for the dam would flood the critical habitat of this variety of bat. The 
Sierra Club maintained that the Corps ignored warnings from the 
Department of the Interior about the impact of the dam on the Indiana bat 
population. In rejecting the Sierra Club's position, the Eighth Circuit viewed 
the mandate of section 7 to be mainly procedural and concluded that once a 
project agency has consulted with the Department of Interior, it has satisfied 
5
" 43 Fed. Reg. 875 (1978) (to be cofdified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(c)). Section 402.04(c) states 
that, 
It is the primary responsibility of each Federal agency requesting consultation to 
conduct the appropriate studies and to provide the biological information necessary for 
an adequate review of the effect and identified activity or program has upon listed 
species or their habitat. To the extent it is available, the Service will upon request 
provide all relevant data and reports, personnel, and recommendations for additional 
studies or surveys, but the Service is not obligated to fund any such additional studies or 
surveys. (emphasis added). 
60 43 Fed. Reg. 875-876 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(e) (1)-(3)). 
61 Fed. Reg. 876 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(f)). 
62 43 Fed. Reg. 876 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.05). 
63 Currently, 177 species of fauna in the United States have been formally listed as endangered 
and 37 species of fauna as threatened. Twenty species of flora have been listed as endangered and 
two species as threatened. Thirty-three critical habitats have been designated. 41 Fed. Reg. 24523 
(1976). The Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution is directed "to review (1) species of plants 
which are now or may become endangered or threatened and (2) methods of adequately 
conserving such species, and to report to Congress, within one year after December 28, 1973, the 
results of such review including recommendations for new legislation or the amendment of 
existing legislation." 16 U.S.C. § 1541 (1976). The Smithsonian Institution's report listed 
approximately 3100 species of endangered or threatened plants. The report is printed in H.R. 
REP. 94-51, 94th CoNe. 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CooE. CoNe. & Ao. NEws 439. It is 
anticipated that many of these species will eventually be afforded the Act's protection. 
64 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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its obligation under the ESA. In terms of the substantive effect of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service's expert opinion concerning the project's impact on 
endangered species the court stated that, "Consultation under Section 7 does 
not require acquiescence. . . . [T]he responsibility for [the project] decision 
after consultation is ... vested ... in the agency involved."65 The Eighth 
Circuit viewed the FWS's function as being strictly advisory with no veto 
power over the actions of other federal agencies. At no point did the court 
examine the specific obligations imposed by the Act in order to insure that 
endangered species would not be jeopardized by agency action. 
The result in the case can be explained possibly on the ground that the 
continued existence of a sp~cies was not threatened by federal action; the 
court noted that there are approximately 700,000 Indiana bats in existence and 
that this Corps of Engineers project would affect the habitat of only about ten 
thousand. 66 Also, the court had approved the environmental impact statement 
prepared for the project and consequently the court may have believed that 
the adequate EIS relieved the Corps of its obligation to consider any 
environmental effect. 
During the same year that Sierra Club v. Froehlke was decided, the Fifth 
Circuit also ruled on a section 7 case, National Wildlife Federation v. 
Coleman.61 The Coleman case concerned the construction of a federally-
assisted highway through a portion of the sole habitat of the Mississippi 
sandhill crane an endangered bird species. At the time of the litigation only 
forty sandhill cranes were known to exist. The district court had dismissed the 
National Wildlife Federation's complaint based upon the section 7 
allegations. 68 However, on appeal the Fifth Circuit gave section 7 
requirements considerably more significance than had the Sixth Circuit in 
Sierra Club v. Froehlke. It determined that there was a mandatory duty 
imposed upon federal agencies to consult with the Department of Interior and 
to insure that agency activities do not jeopardize endangered species. 
Although the court recognized no project-stopping veto power granted the 
Interior Department by the ESA, it did take a significant step to expand the 
scope of analysis of section 7 consultation of judicial review. Judge Simpson 
stated that the Department of Transportation had failed to properly consider 
not only the direct but also the indirect effects of the highway's construction 
on the sandhill crane. 69 This comprehensive project review would require the 
sponsoring agency to evaluate secondary impacts in much the same way as 
does an EIS. Implied from the court's holding is the substantive principle that 
section 7 of the ESA mandates a broad-based endangered species impact 
analysis in the planning of federal projects. In terms of practical effect, the 
result of the Fifth Circuit's decision is that a project which lacks this wide-
ranging analysis may not proceed. In the Coleman decision, the highway 
construction was enjoined until the Department of Interior determined that 
6
' lei. at 1303. 
66 Id. 
67 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). 
6
' 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975). 
6
" 529 F.2d 359, 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). 
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project modifications brought the activity within compliance of section 7 
requirements. By reaching this result, the court effectively gave the 
Department of Interior limited authority to regulate federal aid highways. 
Not all of the cases have involved the use of provisions of the Endangered 
Species Act to halt federal developmental projects. In Defenders of Wildlife 
v. Andrus70 a district court had an opportunity to review the regulations of the 
Fish and Wildlife Service with regard to the sport hunting of migratory birds. 
The plaintiffs alleged that since the regulations permitted hunting before 
sunrise and after dark, endangered bird species would be inadvertently killed 
because hunters could not distinguish between them and other birds during 
those periods. In striking down the regulations as being arbitrary and 
unlawful, the court rejected the contention of the Fish and Wildlife Service 
that its duty under the ESA was solely to avoid jeopardizing the continued 
existence of protected species. However, the court ruled that the FWS had an 
"affirmative duty to increase the population of protected species."71 This duty 
included the use of all methods necessary to increase the numbers of 
endangered species so that they will no longer be in that category. 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus may present an unusual case since the 
programs and regulations of the Secretary of Interior are involved and not a 
project-oriented, developmental agency. Under section 7 of the ESA, the 
Secretary is directed to review the programs under his authority and "utilize 
such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this Act."72 It could be argued 
that this same standard should be the mandate of every federal agency and 
hence the affirmative duties identified by the district court would be generally 
applicable. At any rate, it is worth noting the expansive substantive 
interpretation given the statute by this court and consider it part of an 
emerging trend in the law. 
This trend is also represented in the recent decision of Connor v. Andrus. 73 
There a plaintiff successfully challenged Fish and Wildlife Service and State 
of Texas migratory waterfowl regulations on substa'ltive administrative law 
grounds. The agency rules prohibiting the hunting of the endangered Mexican 
duck in designated portions of New Mexico, Texas and Arizona were struck 
down as being arbitrary and capricious. The district court determined that the 
federal and state hunting ban would not serve to increase the population of the 
endangered species. The court's surprising conclusion stemmed from its 
determination that the hunting ban would indirectly aid in the destruction of 
the critical habitat of the endangered duck species. The court concluded that 
designated "no-hunting" lands would now be put to a more intensive land use 
since they could no longer be reserved for duck hunting. The ultimate result of 
this land use shift, the court felt, would be to eliminate necessary habitat for 
the Mexican duck and thus further reduce the size of species populations. 
Therefore in order to protect the habitat of the duck, Judge Wood enjoined 
the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulations thereby permitting the endangered 
species to be hunted in three states. 
'
0 428 F.Supp. 167 (D. D.C. 1977). 
71 Id. at 170. 
72 16 u.s.c. § 1536 (1976). 
73 Civil Action No. EP-77 CA-187 (W.D. Tex. 1978). 
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This decision is unsettling for a number of reasons. First, it places the 
burden of proof upon the federal agency acting to protect an endangered 
species. Here, the district court did not defer to or acknowledge any agency 
expertise in the endangered species field. The court, using as its sole basis 
information gathered at a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary 
injunction, invalidated a regulation which had been formally proposed, 
redrafted, and finally issued as a formal agency regulation. To find these 
regulations as having "no rational basis" would seemingly require a more 
broadly based factual determination. Second, the court enjoined the agency 
rules without discussing the traditional tests for injunctive relief. It is difficult 
to imagine just how the plaintiffs could have satisfied the requisite showings of 
irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits and a furthering of the 
public interest in order to justify the award of the injunction. And third, this 
decision may encourage other individuals and organizations to challenge 
protective regulations in local federal districts. However, taking the Connor 
v. Andrus decision at face value, it ironically supports the evolving philosophy 
that in ESA cases federal agencies must exercise their responsibilities in a 
manner that minimizes the total adverse effects upon endangered species, 
both direct and indirect. 
The most recent case considering the Endangered Species Act, TV A v. 
Hill, 74 is also the most well-known. A brief factual discussion of the case is 
necessary. Every year since 1967 Congress had authorized funds for the 
construction of the Tellico dam located on the Tennessee River. In 1968 
construction was commenced on the $100 million structure which would 
flood 16,500 acres if completed.75 After litigation over the adequacy of the 
environmental impact statement had been concluded/6 a University of 
Tennessee ichthyologist, Dr. David A. Etnier, discovered the existence of a 
small fish he named the snail darter. He determined that the segment of the 
Little Tennessee River that was to be impounded was the sole habitat of the 
species.77 On December 28, 1973 the Endangered Species Act was enacted 
with the result that on November 10, 1975 the snail darter had been listed by 
the Department of the Interior as an endangered species78 and in April of 1976 
the river segment in which the fish is found was formally designated a critical 
habitat. 79 
Although suit was filed to enjoin completion of the project in February of 
1976,80 the trial court agreed with the Department of the Interior in 
concluding that completion of the dam would probably result in the complete 
destruction of the snail darter species; it refused to grant the permanent 
injunction sought by the plaintiffs. The court believed that the continuation of 
funding for the project indicated a congressional interpretation that the ESA 
74 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978). 
75 549 F.2d 1064, 1067 (6th Cir. 1977). 
76 See, Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. TVA, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). 
77 549 F.2d 1064, 1068 (5th Cir. 1977). 
"40 Fed. Reg. 47505-06 (1975), codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1977). 
79 41 Fed. Reg. 13926-28 (1976), codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1977). 
80 419 F. Supp. 753 (E. D. Tenn. 1976). 
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did not bar completion of the dam. The cost of the dam, the degree of 
completion and the fact that the court believed that the project could not be 
modified to mitigate the effect upon the snail darter undoubtedly account for 
the decision. As if to confirm the district court's decision, Congress soon 
appropriated $9 million for continuing work on the Tellico project.81 
On appeal, 82 the Sixth Circuit took a position diametrically opposed to the 
lower court. In a strongly-worded opinion written by Judge Celebrezze, the 
court found that the TV A dam project had violated section 7 of the Act and 
consequently it permanently enjoined further construction. In reversing the 
district court, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the ESA did not provide 
the Secretary of Interior with veto power over the activities of other federal 
agencies. However, the court did find a duty to satisfy "compliance 
standards" set by Interior which could then be considered upon judicial 
review. 
Of greater significance was the court's resolution of the "on-going project" 
issue. The threshold question was whether the ESA applied to such a project 
initiated prior to the enactment of the statute. In unequivocal terms the court 
stated that the Act did apply to on-going projects, reasoning that detrimental 
impacts upon endangered species may not be apparent prior to construction. 
The degree to which the project was completed was not influential in the Sixth 
Circuit's opinion; it viewed the possible destruction of a species as the decisive 
factor. "[W]hether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is irrelevant in calculating 
the social and scientific costs attributable to the disappearance of a unique 
form of life."83 Consequently, the court issued a permanent injunction.84 
Undaunted, the appropriation committees of both Houses of Congress 
sponsored legislation, which was ultimately enacted, which continued 
funding for the Tellico project.85 
Finally in 1978 the United States Supreme Court issued its decision 
concerning the snail darter controversy and resoundingly supported the Sixth 
Circuit's interpretation of the ESA. 86 The Court found the language of section 
7 to be unambiguous and concluded that the operation of the Tellico dam 
violated both the spirit and the wording of the Act. Of great importance to the 
Court's decision was the fact that the issue of the impact of the dam upon the 
snail darter had been conclusively resolved both by the TV A's prior 
admissions and by the uncontroverted findings of the Secretary of Interior. 87 
Consequently Chief Justice Burger addressed a large portion of the majority 
opinion to the question of whether the TV A, under the particular facts of the 
case, would be in violation of the ESA. After reviewing the development of 
81 Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations 
Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-355, 90 Stat. 889 (1976). 
82 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977). 
83 ld. atl07l. 
84 ld. at 1075. Judge Celebrezze added that, "[T]his injunction shall remain in effect until 
Congress, by appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance with the Act or the snail 
darter has been deleted from the list of endangered species or its critical habitat materially 
redefined." ld. 
85 Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797 (1978). 
86 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978). 
87 I d. at 2290. 
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federal endangered species legislation the Court determined that the 1973 Act 
"represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of 
endangered species ever enacted by any nation."88 The TVA's argument 
founded upon legislative intent not to subject this major, on-going project to 
the rigors of the ESA was rejected out of hand by the Court. Under the 
provisions of the Act, species extinction was to be avoided "whatever the 
cost" and endangered species were to be accorded "priority over the 'primary 
missions' of federal agencies."89 Viewing this policy decision as clearly within 
the province of the Congress, the Court found no legislative or statutory 
authority vested in the judiciary to override the congressional decision. The 
broad interpretation given the ESA is well worth noting for application to 
future cases challenging federal actions. 
The major idea to be taken from the TV A v. Hill decision is that the 
Endangered Species Act imposes upon all federal agencies both a 
consultation requirement and a substantive decision-making standard upon 
which courts can evaluate agency compliance. In addition, when the facts 
clearly indicate that a federal action will completely extinguish an 
endangered life form or critical habitat, the judiciary has very little choice but 
to enjoin the activity. The Court's decision necessarily did not address the 
more difficult factual situations where species or habitat impact is unclear or 
debatable. In these instances the agency's decisions should be evaluated in 
light of the policy embodied in the ESA. Future cases will undoubtedly 
develop the law concerning (1) the question of when agencies must take 
protective actions with respect to endangered species and (2) what level of 
proof is necessary to establish an agency obligation to act. 
Congressional reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in TVA v. Hill was 
quick. Congress passed the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 
within four months of the Supreme Court's decision. 90 This addition to the Act 
contained a variety of separate provisions but it specifically addressed the 
Tellico dam controversy. 91 Under a general exemption procedure,92 the 
88 Id. at 2292. 
89 I d. at 2297. The majority also disposed of the TV A's second line of defense that the ESA 
should not be applied retroactively to affect an on-going federal project. The Court ruled that the 
section 7 requirements must be met when there remains any project activities which must yet be 
"authorized, funded, or carried out." 98 S. Ct. at 2299. Furthermore the TV A argument that 
continuing appropriations for the Tellico project represented a limited implied repeal of the ESA 
was solidly rejected. The most that the Court was willing to accept was that the congressional 
committees did not think that the ESA was applicable to the Tellico dam project. Standing alone, 
the Court felt that this did not constitute a statutory repeal. This portion of the Supreme Court's 
decision is especially noteworthy since it virtually eliminates one possible defense to future ESA 
actions - that of retroactivity. 
90 Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U .S.C. § 1531). 
91 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 5(i)(1), 92 Stat. 3761 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539). In 
addition, this immediate exemption provision also applies to the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir 
on the Laramie River in Wyoming. See [1978 Current Developments] ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1129 
and [1978 Current Developments) ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1379. 
92 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3752-60 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(7)(e)-(p) ). 
Two other exemption procedures are authorized by the Act. First, if the Secretary of Defense 
"finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security" the Endangered Species 
Committee must grant the exemption "for any agency action." Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 
3758 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(i)). This exceedingly broad power caused 
President Carter to mention in his bill signing statement that, "I am asking . . . that the exercise 
of possible national security exemption by the Secretary of Defense be undertaken only in grave 
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amendments direct the newly-created Endangered Species Committee93 to 
decide whether or not the Tellico project should receive an exemption. The 
Committee must find that (1) there are no "reasonable and prudent" 
alternatives to dam completion, 94 (2) that the benefits of completion "clearly 
outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with 
conserving the species or its critical habitat,"95 and (3) that such action is "in 
the public interest."96 
Although the 1978 amendments to the Endangered Species Act will 
dictate the future of the Tellico project they also have a broad impact beyond 
the scope of the problem presented by the Tennessee dam. First, they reaffirm 
the obligation of federal agencies to insure that their actions do not jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species. 
Also, these agencies must protect against the "destruction or adverse 
modification"97 of critical habitat. The duty to consult with the Department of 
Interior on matters involving endangered species is unavoidable. Second, by 
adding a general exemption procedure98 to be administered by the Com-
mittee, Congress has insured that many "development/wildlife" controver-
sies will be decided before an administrative rather than judicial forum.99 This 
system along with the new consciousness of endangered species matters 
circumstances posing a clear and immediate threat to national security." (emphasis added) 14 
WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2002 (Nov. 13, 1978). Second, the President is authorized to grant 
exemptions "for the repair and replacement of a public facility" in any area declared to be a major 
disaster area under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92Stat. 3759 (1978) (to 
be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7}(p)). 
93 Pub. L. No. 95-632, §3,92Stat.3753(1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(7)(e)). This 
committee is composed of seven members including six governmental officials (the Secretaries of 
Agriculture, Army, Interior, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors) and one selected from nominees recommended by state governors. 
94 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3758 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(h)(1)(A) 
(i)). This standard also appears in section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act at 49 
U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). That provision prohibits "the use of any publicly owned land from a 
public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local 
significance . . . or any land from an historic site. . . . " 
95 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3758 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 
(7)(h)( 1)(A)(ii)). 
96 Id. The term "public interest" is undefined in the Act. 
97 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92Stat.3752 (1978) (to becodifiedat16U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(a)). The 
language employed in amending this part of the section 7 standard is new and expands the 
protective coverage for critical habitat. Both the "destruction" and the "adverse modification" of 
critical habitat are now prohibited by section 7(a). The latter objective- prohibiting adverse 
modifications - may be the most important change in the coverage of this section and will focus 
future litigation on the question of what constitutes an adverse modification of habitat. 
98 See note 3 supra. The procedure allows a "federal agency, the Governor of the State in 
which an agency action will occur, if any, or a permit or license applicant" to apply for the 
exemption. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3755 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7) 
(g)(l)). 
99 This does not mean that judicial review of the exemption procedure is prohibited. A 
decision by the three member review board created pursuant to Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 
3752 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(g)(3)(A)) that an irresolvable conflict does not 
exist or that the exemption applicant has not met the requirement necessary for exemption would 
be reviewable in federal district court. See Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92Stat. 3756 (1978) (to be codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(g)(5)). On the other hand, any final decision of the cabinet-level 
Endangered Species Committee is reviewable in United States Courts of Appeal as long as the 
petition for review is filed within ninety days of the Committee's decision. Pub!. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 
92 Stat. 3756 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U .S.C.§ 1536 (7)(n) ). Although not specifically stated, this 
appears to create an exclusive grant of jurisdiction to review Committee determinations. 
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fostered by the Hill case and the 1978 amendments could serve to dissuade 
federal agencies from undertaking harmful projects since they would be 
reviewed by the Department of the Interior. Third, Congress has not found 
that compliance with NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement 
satisfies either the substantive or procedural mandate of the amended 
Endangered Species Act. Although one section of the new law authorizes a 
coordination of the ESA biological assessment with the NEPA process, 100 no 
comprehensive integration of the two statutes has been attempted. It seems 
apparent that Congress intended to preserve the independent function of the 
Endangered Species Act apart from any presidential effort to "streamline" 
federal environmental review activities.101 
The developed case law discussed above must be viewed as a logical 
precursor to the 1978 amendments. These decisions emphasized the 
importance of the Endangered Species Act and the need for federal agencies 
to be sensitive to ESA considerations in project planning and permit granting. 
Now agencies must be concerned about the adverse effects of their actions 
upon endangered or threatened species whether or not NEPA analysis has 
been undertaken. The future will disclose whether the administrative system 
provided by the recent amendment will permit a careful review and 
resolution of agency conflicts while also preserving endangered species of 
plants and animals. 
III. NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT 
The environmental movement of the late 1960's led to the enactment of 
NEPA in 1969 and greatly influenced the passage of a broad range of special 
environmental laws and executive orders. It also generated a new interest in 
older laws which previously had little or no effect on federal programs. These 
laws have recently regained vitality due to legislative amendments and new 
judicial interpretations. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 
(NHPA) 102 is a prime example of this development and in terms of federal 
programs, potentially one of the most important. 
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 established the National 
Register of Historic Places. 103 The Act also required federal agencies to 
consult with the newly-created Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
whenever federal projects could have adverse impacts on historic or 
100 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3753 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(c)). In 
addition, this coordination is merely suggested and not made mandatory by the Act. 
101 See, Executive Order 11991, 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Doc. 808 (May 24, 1977). This 
order directed the Council on Environmental Quality to issue formal regulations to control 
agencies' NEPA compliance activities. In announcing the executive order, President Carter 
stressed his intention to reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data. 
If the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 are indicators of the congressional 
prospensity to enact specialized environmental review statutes with unique procedural 
requirements, then the total integration of all environmental review in the EIS will not be 
possible. 
102 Pub. L. No. 89-665,80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §470 (1976)). TheActhas been 
amended several times. See, Pub. L. No. 91-383, 84 Stat. 825 (1970); Pub. L. No. 94-458,90 Stat. 
1939 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1313 (1976). 
103 16 U .S.C. § 470(a) (1976). 
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archaeological sites. 104 Executive Order 11593,105 issued in 1971, was 
interpreted by the Advisory Council to expand the authority of the 1966 Act to 
include properties eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic 
Places. This order provided protection equal to those properties actually 
listed on the Register. In 1976, the National Historic Preservation Act was 
amended to formally extend the protections of the Act to such eligible 
properties, 106 and thus the statutory authority was brought in line with the 
existing Executive Order. Additional legislative and administrative action in 
the "preservation area" can be expected. 107 
The full impact of the Act and Executive Order began to be felt after the 
Advisory Council issued regulations for carrying out the Act and the Order in 
early 1974.108 In short, the Advisory Council procedures required that a 
federal agency consult a State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) when 
determining how its activities will affect historic or archaeological sites. 109 
The procedures also require that the SHPO, along with the Advisory Council 
and the interested federal agency, reach written agreement in certain cases on 
how to mitigate any adverse effects expected from a federal project. no The 
Advisory Council procedures also contain minimum review periods which 
can cause delays for various federal projects. For instance, the Advisory 
Council may take 30 days to review a "no adverse effect" determination made 
by a federal agency.lll This review follows the required survey activities, 
consultations with the SHPO, and possibly a determination of eligibility for 
104 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976). This sub-section would seem to apply to both detrimental and 
beneficial effects of federal actions. 
105 Executive Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U .S.C. § 470 at 429 
(1976). 
106 Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1320 (1976). 
107 In his May 23, 1977 Environmental Message to Congress President Carter proposed the 
creation of a National Heritage Trust to "preserve places that have special natural, historical, 
cultural, and scientific value." 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 782,783 (May30, 1977). Although 
various programs for implementing the Trust concept are still being debated and additional 
authorizing legislation from Congress will be needed, it is reasonably certain that the President's 
proposal will be carried forward at least in part. Already the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and 
the Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation of the National Park Service have been 
merged together into a new Department of the Interior sub-agency called the Heritage 
Conservation and Recreation Service. 43 Fed. Reg. 7482 (1978). Proposals for future Trust 
programs include a review and consultation procedure for both natural and cultural resources 
similar to that imposed currently by the Advisory Council procedures on federal activities 
affecting historic or archaeological properties. 
Other federal authorities can be expected to impose additional cultural resource protection 
responsibilities onto federal projects and programs. For instance, the Archeological and Historic 
Preservation Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. § 469a-1 (1976) establishes the requirement that federal 
activities be conducted so as to avoid irreparable harm to archaeologically significant properties. 
The Act also provides a series of funding mechanisms for conducting salvage work for 
archaeological properties adversely affected by federal projects. 
10
" 36 C.F.R. pt. BOO (1977). On October 25, 1978 the Advisory Council proposed extensive 
amendments to the pt. 800 regulations. See, 43 Fed. Reg. 50650-660, (1978). These modifications 
were intended to simplify Advisory Council commenting procedures and streamline the entire 
process. On January 30, 1979 the Advisory Council issued its final regulations which modified the 
previous proposal. See 44 Fed. Reg. 6068-6081 (1979). 
109 44 Fed. Reg. 6074-75, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§800. 4(a)-(b)), 800.5. Strict time limits 
are imposed upon the SHPO and if no response to a request for his opinion is received within 30 
days, concurrence is presumed. 44 Fed. Reg. 6075, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)-(b). 
"
0 44 Fed. Reg. 6076, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c). 
"' Under the final regulations, this period has been reduced from theprior45 days to30days. 
See, 44 Fed. Reg. 6075, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(a). 
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the National Register of Historic Places made by the Heritage Conservation 
and Recreation Service. 112 
The National Historic Preservation Act and Advisory Council procedures 
have placed a significant additional obligation on federal agencies. By itself, 
NEPA requires that agencies evaluate the impacts of their activities on 
cultural as well as natural and ecological resources. 113 The NHPA, as 
implemented through the Advisory Council procedures, often requires 
additional investigations and documentation for cultural resource impacts 
beyond those required by NEPA.114 These additional requirements may be 
particularly onerous from the agency's viewpoint when archaeological 
properties are involved. Archaeological properties eligible for the National 
Register are found in many areas of the country and their presence and the 
precise location usually cannot be detected without extensive field surveys 
often involving subsurface excavation. These research requirements, when 
combined with the Advisory Council's review procedures, could cause 
federal project agencies substantial expense and delay. 
During the period immediately following its enactment in 1966, the NHP A 
was the focus of only a small amount of litigation, most of which did not 
progress beyond the federal district court level of review. Of these cases, most 
concerned NEPA violation charges, but they also involved direct judicial 
consideration of the Historic Preservation Act. These cases identify the 
requirements of section 106 of the NHPA (Section 470f of Title 16) as separate 
and apart from the NEPA statute. Section 470f requires federal agencies 
"having direct or indirect jurisdiction" over a federally-assisted or licensed 
activity to "take into account" the impact of the activity upon historic 
properties that are included or eligible for inclusion on the National 
Register.' 15 In addition, the federal agency must permit the Advis~ry Council 
112 Eligibility for listing is determined in conjunction with the standards established in 36 
C.F.R. § 63 (1977) and 44 Fed. Reg. 6074 to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (3). 
113 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (4) (1976). This section states that one element of national policy will be 
to "preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage and 
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual 
choice." 
114 Newly-proposed amendments to the Advisory Council's regulations address the question 
of NEPA compliance. 44 Fed. Reg. 6078, 6079 (1979). These new regulations suggest that 
agencies should coordinate their NEP A and NHP A review processes, although at the same time 
flatly stating that the two statutes are "independent." The newly-issued Council on Environmen-
tal Quality regulations concerning federal EIS preparation direct that NEPA compliance should 
be combined with other statutory requirements "to the fullest extent possible." 43 Fed. Reg. 55997 
(1978), to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25. In its statement of policy the proposed NEPA 
regulations direct federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible" to "integrate the requirements 
of NEPA with other planning and environmental review procedures required by law or by 
agency practice so that all such procedures run concurrently rather than consecutively." 43 Fed. 
Reg. 55991 (1978) to be codif\ed at 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(c). Although the language employed seems 
more fitting in the criminal law context, the intention is clearly to streamline all federal 
environmental review. 
115 Section 106, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976) provides as follows: 
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed 
Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal 
department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall, 
prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior 
to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the 
undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or 
eligible for inclusion in the Nationa!Register. The headofany such Federal agency shall 
afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation established under sections 470i to 
470n of this title a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking. 
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to comment on the proposal.ll 6 A brief review of the key NHPA cases will 
illustrate the expanding scope of federal actions subject to section 470f and the 
emerging substantive interpretation given to the Act. 
The breadth of federal action subject to the requirements of the NHPA is 
illustrated by the case of Edwards v. First Bank of Dundee. 117 There, plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin the relocation of a bank regulated by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation until the FDIC (1) prepared an environmental impact 
statement and (2) consulted with the Advisory Council. The First Dundee 
Bank had requested permission from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) to relocate its operations then quartered in a structure 
located in an historic area of Dundee, Illinois; the bank wished to demolish the 
building after the move. 
The district court found that since the FDIC' s permission was required in 
order for the bank to relocate, the FDIC had "authority to license" the 
relocation pursuant to section 106 of the NHPA, and therefore was required to 
follow the section 106 procedures. The court enjoined the relocation and 
demolition pending compliance by the FDIC with NEPA and NHPA. The 
effect of the decision is to give the federal courts power to enjoin "non-federal 
entities from performing activities in contravention" of agency responsibility 
to prevent those activities.ll8 Furthermore, Edwards exemplifies the 
application of environmental review requirements to federal regulatory 
actions as opposed to the directly developmental activities. 
An important early decision interpreting the NHPA was Ely v. Velde. 119 
The case involved a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (LEAA)l20 to the State of Virginia for the purpose of constructing a 
medical and reception center for Virginia prison inmates in the Green Springs 
area of Louisa County. Plaintiffs claimed that the LEAA should have filed an 
environmental impact statement on this grant and in addition claimed that the 
LEAA had violated section 470f of the NHPA by failing to take into account 
the effect of this proposed center on three nearby homes listed in theN ational 
Register of Historic Places. The federal government claimed that the LEAA 
was without authority to impose any conditions on grants it would make 
under the Safe Streets Act. 121 The court found, however, that the LEAA was 
obliged to comply with the procedural requirements of both NEPA and the 
NHPA. It determined that it was not the congressional intent to exempt 
activities under the Safe Streets Act from the command of other federal 
statutes. 
Ely is significant because there, the NHPA was applied to a situ-
ation where the federal activity would not directly involve a property on 
the Historic Register but rather would have a secondary effect on such a 
property. Such an effect analysis could be a valuable tool for environmental 
litigants in situations where an agency's activities do not have a direct impact 
lis Id. 
117 393 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
118 Id. at 682. 
119 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
120 The LEAA is empowered to make grants to state planning agencies pursuant to 16 U .S.C.§ 
3733 (1976). 
121 42 U .S.C. § 3701 {1976). 
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on an historic property but rather have a secondary impact which would 
damage or in some other way adversely affect an historic property indi-
rectly.122 The case also indicates that the courts consider the NHPA applicable 
to all federal agencies regardless of their enabling authority of responsi-
bilities. 
Prior to the 1976 amendment to the FHPA, a number of cases had raised 
the issue of determining the time when the section 470f requirements apply to 
federal activities.123 These cases all concluded that the language of the statute 
applying to federal actions that affect any "district, site, building, structure, or 
object that is included in the National Register"124 was not intended to 
encompass projects that had been approved before the property in question 
had been included in the National Register. The effect of these decisions, 
which arose largely from situations involving urban renewal demolition 
grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was 
to exempt any future demolition or construction from review by the Advisory 
Council once federal monies had been spent for planning of an urban renewal 
project. This was true even if the HUD-funded project had only progressed to 
the preliminary stages. 125 
The recent legislative amendment to the National Historic Preservation 
Act126 was intended to preclude these results from occurring again. The 
inquiry must now focus upon the question of whether or not the proposed 
activity will affect a property" eligible for inclusion" on the National Register. 
Section 470f now states that the 
head of any federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over 
a proposed federal or federally assisted undertaking . . . shall, 
prior to the approval of the expenditure of any federal funds . . . 
take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, 
----
122 The case of Petterson v. Froehlke, 354 F. Supp. 45 (D. Ore. 1972) also lends support to this 
view. There, the district court considered a suit involving the federally-funded expansion of the 
Portland Airport. Plaintiffs were citizens from the State of Washington who had challenged an 
Army Corps of Engineers' dredge and fill permit which had been granted for the filling of 640 
acres of the Columbia River. Plaintiffs alleged that the expansion of the Portland Airport would 
affect the Fort Vancouver National Historic Site which was more than ten miles from the airport. 
They alleged that the Army Corps of Engineers' permit and the airport expansion would create 
increased auto traffic and consequently more air pollution. The court concluded that the Corp of 
Engineers' dredge and fill permit came within the protections of FHPA, but it felt that on the facts 
the alleged impacts of the permitting action were too attenuated to require compliance with the 
mandate of section 470f. 
In contrast to Velde and Froehlke is Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations v. 
Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977). At issue there was the contention that the Urban 
Mass Transit Administration had failed to properly take "into account" the impact of the tunnel 
upon several railroad structures listed on the National Register of Historic Places when it funded a 
1.7 mile commuter rail tunnel. The district court found no violation and unfortunately failed to 
address plaintiffs' specific contention that UMT A had not considered the secondary or indirect 
impact of the tunnel upon the listed structures. 
123 See, e.g., St. Joseph Historical Soc'y. v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of St. 
Joseph, Mo., 366 F. Supp. 605 (W.O. Mo.1973); South Hill NeighborhoodAss'n. v. Romney,421 
F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970). 
124 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970) (amended 1976). 
125 Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
126 Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1320 (1976). The legislative history behind this amendment is 
almost void of any direct comment. This provision was part of a multi-purpose amendment to the 
Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965. See [1976) U.S. CooE CoNe. & Ao. NEws 2442, 
2461. 
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building, structure or object that is included in or eligible for inclu-
sion in the National Register. (emphasis added) 127 
One recent case, however, Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority,128 
ignores this recent legislative amendment. In Hart, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had given a grant to the Denver 
Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) for an urban renewal project. Part of this 
project involved the renovation of the Daniels and Fisher Tower in Denver, 
Colorado. DURA had proposed to sell the Tower to a private developer. The 
Colorado State Historical Society and the State Historic Preservation Officer 
jointly sued the City of Denver and HUD to enjoin the sale of the building to 
this private developer. The district court granted the injunction until HUD 
had complied with its own regulations which had been drafted to satisfy the 
Advisory Council procedures. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that section 470£ of the NHP A was 
inapplicable since the approval of the expenditure of federal funds occurred 
prior to the inclusion of the Tower on the National Register. The project loan 
and capital grant contract was approved on March 7, 1968, while the Tower 
was listed on the National Register on December 2, 1969. The redevelopment 
authority had purchased the Daniels and Fisher Tower and offered it for sale 
on April16, 1970. No buyers had been found for five years. But on April16, 
1975, the sale to the private purchasers was negotiated. The Tenth Circuit was 
clearly opposed to requiring HUD to solicit comments from the Advisory 
Council concerning DURA's agreement to sell the Tower. Not only did the 
court refuse to give retroactive application to the 1976 amendment, it failed 
even to mention it in the opinion. The court probably thought that since the 
HUD funds which were used to acquire these properties had already been 
expended, HUD had very little control over the actual disposition of the 
Daniels and Fisher Tower areas and consequently, requirements to comply 
with the Advisory Council procedures would have been a futile exercise. 
The Hart case raises interesting questions involving federal support of 
long-term planning in redevelopment programs. When the federal govern-
ment makes a grant for these purposes, it may not have a precise knowledge 
of what form the redevelopment will take in the future. Since section 470f is 
prospective in application, in that it applies to situations arising prior to the 
actual expenditure of federal funds, at the early stages of project planning, it 
would seem incumbent upon the federal agencies to determine to the 
maximum extent possible whether their present or future activities will affect 
historic properties that are either currently listed or eligible for inclusion on 
the National Register. If this is the case, then compliance with the Advisory 
Council procedures should be undertaken. 
A more perplexing problem suggested by the Hart case involves a 
situation where federal funds are granted to state or local entities for a variety 
of purposes and projects. As the connection between the federal granting 
agency and the ultimate acting agency becomes more attenuated, it would 
seem Hs though the federal agency would find it more difficult to comply with 
the command of section 470f. A federal agency having a continuing 
127 16 u.s.c. § 470f (1976). 
128 551 F.2d 1178 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
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relationship with a state or local grantee can, if it wishes, exert influence over 
the actions of that grantee. 
A pair of cases involving federal support of transportation construction 
projects underlines the emerging importance of the NHPA in developing 
litigation. In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Adams, 129 the plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin the completion of 1-66 in the Virginia suburbs of the 
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. After rejecting a number of procedural 
and substantive challenges to the Department of Transportation's (DOT) 
EIS, Chief Judge Haynsworth examined the allegation that DOT had failed to 
comply with the NHPA and the Advisory Council's regulations. The 
substance of the claim was that the highway project would affect listed 
historic properties in the District of Columbia and that the Secretary of 
Transportation had not "taken into account" these impacts when he made his 
decision to fund the roadway segment. The Fourth Circuit accepted the 
district court's and DOT's conclusion that 1-66 would not adversely affect 
historic properties in the District of Columbia. By so doing the court 
approved a federal action that had bypassed the specific consultation 
requirements of the NHPA by a unilateral decision of the sponsoring agency. 
Chief Judge Haynsworth believed that merely by making the EIS available to 
the Advisory Council, DOT complied with the NHP A even though this 
participation falls far short of that required by statute and existing regulation. 
The decision is unfortunate since it authorizes a federal agency to make the 
threshold determination of the scope of impact of its projects independent of 
the advice of either the Advisory Council or the State Historic Preservation 
Officer. Such a result ignores the clear intent of the NHPA and is contrary to a 
policy of inter-agency consultation to encourage sound planning and 
developmental decisions. 
A more enlightened view is to be found in Hall County Historical Society 
v. Georgia Department of Transportation. 130 This case involved a com-
prehensive legal attack intended to enjoin the construction on a .877 mile 
highway project in Gainesville, Georgia known as the "Green Street 
Extension." The federal Department of Transportation, through the Federal 
Highway Administration (FHA), had determined in 1972 that the project did 
not merit the preparation of an EIS alleging that it would not significantly 
affect the quality of the human environment. Although the project was later 
slightly modified, no EIS was prepared and construction commenced in 
September of 1977. In August of 1975 the Green Street Historical District had 
been formally listed on the National Register of Historic Places. 
After addressing other claims of the plaintiff, 131 the district court 
129 571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1978). 
130 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978). 
131 One issue in the case worthy of mention was plaintiff's contention that DOT had violated 
section 4(f) of the Transportation Act, which prohibits the "use of ... any land from an historic 
site of national, State, or local significance" unless there is no "feasible and prudent" alternative. 49 
U.S.C. § 1653(f)(l970). Although on the facts of the case the court found no such use of the land 
either directly or indirectly, future litigants may find section 4(f) a powerful tool and a companion 
to section 470f of the NHPA if they can prove that the constructive use or indirect impact of the 
proposed highway project will ultimately harm the historic structures. The use of evidence 
predicting the economic decline of the area should not be considered irrelevant to that 
determination. 
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considered the contention that the FHA had violated section 470 of the 
NHPA. In strong language, Judge O'Kelley castigated the FHA for its 
"improper delegation" of federal responsibilities under the NHPA and the 
regulations promulgated under its authority. An injunction was granted for 
construction of the extension project pending the FHA's compliance with the 
National Historic Preservation Act. The court described a fact pattern 
wherein the FHA had totally relied upon the Georgia DOT's and the State His-
toric Preservation Officers' determination that the highway project would 
have no effect upon the Green Street Historic District. This "blind reliance" 
upon a state agency's decision is reminiscent of earlier case law invalidating 
state authored negative declaration decisions in the NEPA-EIS context.132 
Hall County Historical Society demonstrates that the NHPA requirements are 
federal agency obligations upon which independent federal analysis must be 
made. The decision is important since it precludes a federal agency making 
developmental grants from abdicating its substantive statutory responsibility 
through this form of delegation. Whether this principle will be extended to 
other federal grant programs remains to be seen; however, it does represent a 
movement towards strict compliance with both the procedural elements of 
the historic preservation law and a substantive standard for agency decision-
making. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that the NHPA section 470f requirements 
remain as independent obligations of federal agencies apart from the impact 
statement mandated by NEP A. Although there is some administrative effort 
being made to integrate the consultation requirement within the NEPA 
process, 133 it would seem that inclusion of historic preservation effects in an 
132 The question of the delegation of federal environmental review responsibilities to non-
federal parties has arisen previously in the context of the NEPA impact statement. See generally, 
RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 778-83 and cases cited therein. In the NEPA situation, the issue 
concerns whether or not a non-federal agency may independently prepare the project EIS when 
NEPA specifically requires the federal agency to undertake the review. The NEPA delegation 
issue has been heavily litigated and in two instances has resulted in legislative changes which 
permit EIS delegation in limited circumstances. See, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (1975), 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (0) (1976) (federal-aid highway program) and Pub. L. No. 93-383,88 
Stat. 638 (1974), codified in 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304 (h) (1976) (HUD delegation for certain 
Community Development Block Grant activities). Whether Congress will permit nonfederal 
agencies to comply with the NHPA or other environmental review statutes remains to be seen. 
133 The proposed CEQ regulations governing the preparation of environmental impact 
statements specifically identifies the National Historic Preservation Act as an .. environment 
review law" which can be integrated with NEPA. 43 Fed. Reg. 55997 (1978) (to becodifiedat40 
C.F.R. § 1502.25) of the proposal states that: 
To the fullest extent possible, agencies shall prepare draft environmental impact 
statements concurrently with and integrated with environmental impact analyses and 
related surveys and studies required by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act . . . the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 . . . the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 . . . and other environmental review laws. 
Whether this section will have any impact on existing agency procedures is problematic. 
134 It remains to be seen whether the federal courts will develop a substantive standard of 
agency decisionmaking based upon a presumption favoring the protection of historic structures 
and areas. Although section 470f only requires that agencies .. take into account" project impacts 
upon historic properties, a combination of the policies behind the Act and the section 470f 
responsibilities could be fashioned into a substantive standard. The United States Supreme Court 
has recently ruled in favor of a local historic preservation ordinance regulating the modification of 
historic structures in New York City. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646 
(1978). 
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EIS will not legally satisfy the specific language of section 470f. 134 For the time 
being, federal agencies planning to take actions which might adversely affect 
historic properties should closely adhere to the Advisory Council procedures. 
Procedural compliance in this area is of great importance. Future cases will 
undoubtedly determine precisely when a federal activity or license "affects" 
historic properties and also what level of substantive compliance with the 
Advisory Council's procedures is necessary. Until then, the handful of 
decided cases indicate that the NHP A presents all federal agencies with 
responsibilities that cannot be ignored. 
IV. WILD ANn SCENIC RIVERS Acr 
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) 135 was originally enacted in 1968, 
and has been subsequently amended several times.136 The statute is jointly 
administered by the Secretary of Interior through the Heritage Conservation 
and Recreation Service and, when national forest lands are involved, by the 
Secretary of Agriculture through the National Forest Service. Section l(b) of 
the Act states the basic objective of the statute that: 
certain selected rivers of the nation which, with their immediate 
environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recre-
ational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural or other similar 
values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they 
and their immediate environments shall be protected for the 
benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations.137 
Section 2 of the Act effectuates this purpose by establishing "a national wild 
and scenic river system" and methods for inclusion of wild, scenic or 
recreational rivers therein.138 It also defines criteria for eligibility for inclusion 
under each of the three classifications included under the law: wild, scenic, 
and recreational. 139 The Wild and Scenic Rivers system presently includes 
1600 miles of river. 14° Fifty-one river segments are currently being considered 
for inclusion in the system.14I 
In section 7 (a), the Act limits the activities of federal agencies with respect 
to rivers included in the system. 142 This section provides in part that "no 
department or agency of the United States shall assist by name, grant, license, 
135 Pub. L. No. 90-542,82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1976)). The legislative 
history supporting the 1968 Wild andScenicRiversActcan be found in [1968] U.S. CovE CoNe. & 
Av. NEws 3801. 
136 Pub. L. No. 92-560,86 Stat. 1174 (1972); Pub. L. No. 93-279, 88Stat.122 (1974); Pub. L. No. 
93-621, 88 Stat. 2094 (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-199,89 Stat. 1117 (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-273,90 Stat. 
375 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-407, 90 Stat. 1238 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-486, 90 Stat. 2327 (1976). 
137 16 U .S.C. § 1271 (1976). 
138 16 U .S.C. § 1273 (1976). 
139 16 U .S.C. § 1273(b)(1)-(3)(1976). 
140 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL EQUALITY, 8TH ANNUAL REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QuALITY, 12 (U.S. Gov't Printing Offc. 1977). 
141 In his May 23, 1977 Environmental Message to Congress, President Carter proposed 
legislation for the addition of 8 river segments, totalling 1,303 miles, to the system. He also 
proposed the designation of 20 river segments for study as potential additions.13 WEEKLY CoMP. 
OF PREs. Doc. 783 & 791 (May 30, 1977). 
142 16 U .S.C. § 1278(a)(1976). 
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or otherwise in the construction of any water resources project that requires a 
direct and adverse effect on the values for which such river was established, as 
determined by the Secretary charged with its administration."143 (emphasis 
added). Section 7(b) extends the same prohibitions to designated potential 
additions to the system for a ten-year period following enactment of the law 
or for three complete fiscal years following any Act of Congress designating a 
river as a potential addition, whichever is later. 144 
Finally, section 7(c) of the Act establishes a consultation requirement. 145 
Federal agencies are required to inform the appropriate Secretary of any 
activities under their control which may affect rivers designated as potential 
additions to the system. The language of section 7(a) indirectly establishes the 
same consultation requirement for river segments already a part of the Wild 
and Scenic system.146 
Several problems plague the implementation of the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act. As is the case with the Endangered Species Act, two separate 
agencies are responsible for the Act's administration. In addition, neither 
agency has ever promulgated regulations explaining its interpretation of the 
Act's implementation. Among those issues which could be clarified by a 
regulation is the definition of "water resources project" under the act. The 
legislative history of the Act would indicate that the term "water resources 
project" under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act includes a greater variety of 
projects than does the same term as used in the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act. 147 Also unclear is the application of the Act to the secondary or growth-
induced impacts of federal activities in the vicinity of a designated segment of 
a study river. 
In addition, the consultation process required by the Act is quite 
cumbersome and time-consuming. The consultation must, in many cases, be 
carried out at the headquarter level in Washington, D.C., between the 
respective agencies and consequently it cannot be conducted directly through 
the regional offices of the Forest Service or the Heritage Conservation and 
Recreation Service. This can lead to lengthy delays as project review 
documents are forwarded from the field to Washington for additional review 
and final decision. 
There has been little judicial review of the section 7 requirements of the 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. The only case ruling directly on the requirements 
of the statute is North Carolina v. Federal Power Commission.148 The 
question there was whether or not the Federal Power Commission could grant 
a license for a hydroelectric power plant on the New River. The Appalachian 
Power Company had been issued a license to construct such a project on June 
14, 197 4. After unsuccessfully seeking an administrative reconsideration of the 
decision to grant the license, the State attempted the judicial review 
embodied in this opinion. At that time the State of North Carolina had 
143 Id. 
144 16 U .S.C. § 1278(b)(l976). 
145 16 U.S.C. § 1278(c)(l976). 
146 16 U .S.C. § I278(a) (1976). 
147 See H.R. REP. No. 1623, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. ConE. CoNe. & Ao. 
NEws 3801. 
148 533 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.), vacated 429 U.S. 891 (1976). 
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recommended that a segment of the New River be included in the Wild and 
Scenic River system and in addition, the Department of the Interior was 
conducting a study on the administrative request. The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that although certain designated rivers were protected, section 
7(h) did not apply to state-nominated rivers until they were actually accepted 
into the system by the Secretary of Interior. Consequently, the hydroelectric 
power project could have been validly licensed by the FPC. 
Subsequent to this decision, Congress amended the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act to address the specific problems presented by the facts of the 
case.l49 Section 2(a) was modified to specifically include within the National 
Wild and Scenic River system "that segment of the New River in North 
Carolina extending from the confluence with Dog Creek downstream 
approximately 26.5 miles to the Virginia State line."150 
As noted previously, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act establishes review 
and consultation requirements in a number of instances. However, these 
evaluation duties are combined with substantive standards which can dictate 
the future of a proposed project. For example, section 7 of the Act is more 
than a procedural review requirement. Sections 7(a) and 7(b) give to the 
Secretary charged with the administration of a wild or scenic river the 
authority to determine whether federal agencies' water resource projects 
have "direct and adverse effects" on the protected values of designated Wild 
and Scenic Rivers. 151 If he makes that determination, he may effectively veto 
the proposed federal activity. 0 bviously, this provision of the Act extends the 
impact of the statute far beyond the procedural review mandated by NEPA. 
Given the consultation process developed for the Act, it is doubtful whether 
NEPA documents, prepared and circulated through the NEPA process, can 
satisfy the procedural requirements of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 
Additional review or environmental assessment may be necessary to satisfy 
the requirements of this Act. Future federal actions adversely affecting river 
segments included in WSRA system will be subject to the standards and 
consultation requirements of the Act. The potential power of this statute will 
undoubtedly make future river designations a politically-charged and 
contested decision. 
V. CoAsTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT Acr 
OF 1972 
The Coastal Zone Management Act152 (CZMA) provides for assistance to 
coastal state governments for the development and implementation of coastal 
zone management plans. Coastal Zone Management plans have as their 
149 Pub. L. No. 94-407, 90 Stat. 1238 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (1976)). 
150 Id. To leave no doubt, section 7(a) was also amended to state that: 
[A)ny license heretofore or hereinafter issued by the Federal Power Commission 
affecting the New River in North Carolina shall continue to be effective only for that 
portion of the river which is not included in the National Wild and Scenic River System 
pursuant to section 1273 of this title and no project or undertaking so licensed shall be 
permitted to invade, inundate or otherwise adversely affect such river segment. 
Pub. L. No. 94-407 § 1(c), 90 Stat. 1238 (1976), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a) (1976). 
151 16 U .S.C. §1278(a) (1976). 
152 16 U .S.C. § 1451 (1976). 
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primary function land-use management for the coastal zone to assure the 
orderly and environmentally sound development of these ecologically 
sensitive areas. Pursuant to section 307 of the Act, federal and federally-
assisted or licensed projects are required to be approved by the coastal state as 
consistent with an approved coastal zone management plan.153 The approval 
procedure varies significantly with the type of federal project being 
reviewed. For example, federal agencies conducting direct development 
projects in the coastal zone are required to "insure that the project is, to the 
maximum extent practicable, consistent with the approved state management 
programs."154 However, activities in the coastal zone requiring only a federal 
license or permit must obtain certification from the state coastal zone 
authority "that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved 
program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner consistent with 
the program."155 With respect to state and local government requests for 
federal grant assistance, federal agencies may not approve proposed projects 
that are "inconsistent with a coastal state's management program, except 
upon a finding by the Secretary that such project is consistent with the 
purposes of this chapter or necessary in the interest of national security."156 
At the federal level, the coastal zone management program is adminis-
tered by the Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) of the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of 
Commerce. OCZM has recently promulgated regulations implementing the 
consistency requirements.157 Thirteen coastal zone management plans have 
been approved to date.158 However, many have been approved only within 
the last year and consequently, there have been few consistency deter-
minations made under the provisions of the Act. Court decisions interpreting 
the Act have also been few. 
In City & County of San Francisco v. United States, 159 the plaintiff 
municipal corporations sought to lease an obsolete U.S. Navy shipyard. The 
Navy, however, granted the lease to a private corporation which had 
submitted a higher bid. The city and county then sued the Navy alleging eight 
separate causes of action, one of which was founded upon the requirements of 
the Coastal Zone Management Act.160 The plaintiffs asserted that the lease to 
the private firm did not conform to the plan of the Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission. The district court granted the Government's 
motion for summary judgment on the CZMA issue because the Navy's lease 
had become effective more than seven and one half months prior to the formal 
approval of the state's coastal zone management plan. Therefore, since 
153 16 U.S.C. §1456(c)(1)-(3) (1976). 
154 16 U.S.C. §1456(c)(2) (1976). 
155 16 U .S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1976). 
156 16 u.s.c. § 1456(d) (1976). 
157 43 Fed. Reg. 10510 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930). 
158 See 43 Fed. Reg. 10510 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §930). To date the following 
states have had coastal zone management plans approved in whole or in part by NOAA: 
Washington, Oregon, Massachusetts, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Maine, New Jersey, California, and Maryland. 43 Fed. Reg. 51829 (1978). 
159 443 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
100 ld. at 1127. 
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federal actions need only be consistent with "approved" state plans and there 
was no such plan in existence at the time of the lease, the court reasoned that 
the Navy's action was proper. 
Although the San Francisco case does not provide detailed guidance as to 
the direction of future judicial review, it does illustrate several points. First, it 
is clear that the section 307 "consistency" requirement is recognized as a 
potential litigation tool for parties desiring to challenge federal agency 
actions. In the San Francisco case, the plaintiffs obviously did not place 
primary reliance upon the CZMA-based allegation challenging the Navy but 
it was thought to apply to the Navy's leasing action.161 Second, the 
court considered the plan consistency issue as being distinct from any 
question involving compliance with NEPA. It remains to be seen whether 
future courts will permit environmental impact statements to serve as the 
vehicle for agencies to assert that their activities are consistent with state 
coastal zone plans. 
It is interesting to note that in the San Francisco case the court classified the 
Navy's lease of the tract as a "development project" and not a permit, license, 
or other activity. If the State's plan had been in effect, the Navy would have 
been obligated to "insure that the project is, to the maximum extent 
practicable, consistent with [the State Plan]."162 This finding would raise the 
issue of which federal activities occurring in or affecting the coastal zone 
would be subject to the procedural and substantive requirements of section 
307. If the judiciary broadly construes the application of section 307, 
conformity with the CZMA may become a frequently litigated issue separate 
and apart from NEPA compliance. 163 In addition, substantial amounts of 
agency resources will be needed to ascertain whether an action is consistent 
with a state's plan "to the maximum extent practicable." The San Francisco 
case indicates that the consistency standard of section 307 may become a 
highly important planning requirement and litigation tool once the state 
coastal management plans become effective. 
One other recent decision considers the CZMA with respect to a major 
federal undertaking and it reaffirms the views expressed above. In County of 
Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 164 the Second Circuit reviewed the Interior 
Department's authorization of a leasing program designed to encourage the 
location and development of offshore oil and gas resources. The plaintiffs 
challenged the sufficiency of the EIS prepared by the Department, asserting 
that it did not contain sufficient environmental impact data to satisfy NEP A 
requirements. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the federal government 
had violated an extensive list of other statutes including section 307 of the 
Coastal Zone Management Act. While rejecting the NEPA-based claims and 
ruling in favor of the federal government, the court did discuss the future role 
and requirements of the CZMA. In an effort to assure losing appellees that any 
future off-shore energy development would be carefully regulated, the court 
161 It was the City of San Francisco's eighth claim for relief. Id. at 1117. 
162 16 U .S.C. § 1456(c)(2). 
163 This is especially true considering the broad definition given "coastal zone" (16 U .S.C. § 
1453(1) (1976) and coastal waters" (16 U.S.C. § 1453(2) (1976) in the body of federal statute. 
164 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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noted that such development activites would be controlled by state coastal 
zone plans "to which offshore lessees must adhere."165 However, realizing that 
no such plans yet existed in the Mid-Atlantic area, the court stated that by the 
time the offshore oil and gas fields are discovered, the coastal zone plans will 
be effective and that the "development plans submitted to the Secretary for 
approval will be required under§ 307(c)(3) of CZMA to certify that they are 
consistent with the relevant state's programs."166 
In the future it is not inconceivable that section 307 will become a point of 
conflict between the federal government and state, local and private interests. 
Federal activities needing EIS's may be found to be adequately complying 
with NEPA but independently not satisfying the mandate of the CZMA. It is 
clear that many aspects of the consistency provisions cannot be satisfied 
simply through NEPA compliance for the federal activity. The NEPA 
document can consider the impact of the proposed activity on the land and 
water resources of the coastal zone and its relationship to the approved coastal 
zone management plan. In most cases, however, this NEPA document will 
not be sufficient in itself for review under the consistency section. Addi-
tional documentation will be required to complete the consistency review. 
The timing of the consistency review may also vary from the timing of the 
NEPA process. Also, litigation over the consistency issue alone could interrupt 
any attempted coordination. The seriousness of this procedural problem 
should become apparent as more states have their coastal management plans 
approved and begin implementing the section 307 requirements. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
If recent developments are any indication, specialized environmental 
review statutes will play an increasingly important role in federal project 
planning and in litigation challenging federal activities. The decision of TVA 
v. Hill indicates that the United States Supreme Court will give effect to the 
substantantive requirements of these statutes when the legislative mandate is 
clear. Moreover, the cases discussed above show that environmental and 
other public interest litigants are becoming increasingly aware of potential 
legislative and administrative approaches available to challenge federal 
agency decision-making. This awareness will force federal officials to come to 
grip with the possible spectrum of specialized environmental review 
requirements applicable to their activities. Initially it will be crucial that these 
government officials and their attorneys, and those interested private sector 
parties, know of the existence of these legal obligations and what they require 
of the agencies involved. With this step accomplished, the more difficult task 
of redesigning or adapting federal planning, development, and decision-
making will remain. 
The accommodation of these additional environmental review re-
quirements in federal planning processes may continue to pose serious 
165 ld. at 1380. 
166 Id. at 1381. The court could also have mentioned that under a 1976 amendment to the 
CZMA, a state affected by Outer Continental Shelf energy development must concur with the 
applicant's appraisal that his development program is consistent with the state plan before the 
necessary federal licenses or permits may be issued. See, 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c) (3)(8)(1976). 
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difficulties. The prospects for project delays, legal uncertainty, extended 
litigation and bureaucratic inaction are great. These problems will arise 
because several fundamental issues concerning the implementation of the 
specialized review statutes remain unresolved. These issues, and the opinions 
of the authors as to possible means to resolve them, are briefly stated below. 
A. Substance v. Procedure 
Federal agencies, the courts and, if necessary, the Congress should 
attempt to define which environmental review statutes impose substantive 
requirements and which are purely procedural in nature. Those statutes, or 
sections of statutes, which determine how or if a project will be built must be 
clearly identified. Congress should consider this in drafting new legislation 
and in amending existing laws. Short of amendatory legislation, federal 
agencies should face this issue when promulgating new regulations. Ignoring 
these questions will not make them vanish. Administrative agencies must 
examine their authorizing legislation closely and either publish new simplified 
regulations corresponding to their actual mandate or seek additional authority 
or classification from Congress. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and National 
Historic Preservation Act are two candidates for administrative action of this 
type. In the judicial forum, the courts should decide the issue of whether a 
specialized statute applies to a given fact situation, rather than allowing their 
decisions to avoid such a consideration or finding that NEPA embodies all 
environmental concerns. The recent Supreme Court decision in the Hill case 
may indicate that our highest court is prepared to face the question squarely. 
Lower court decisions on the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act are not so 
hopeful. 
B. Relationship to NEPA 
Again, federal agencies, the courts and Congress must address the 
relationship of the specialized environmental review requirements to the 
comprehensive review mandated by NEPA. Several specific problems must 
be resolved. These include: 
l. the extent to which NEPA procedures can be used to satisfy the 
procedural requirements of the specialized statutes; 
2. whether NEPA compliance can be substituted in full or in part for 
compliance with specialized review statutes having substantive re-
quirements; 
3. the timing and sequence of compliance with NEPA procedures in 
relation to compliance with other review procedures; i.e., which should be 
satisfied first in order to meet legal requirements and to promote an effi-
cient project review; 
4. whether failure to comply with one review requirement affects the 
status of compliance with other requirements; 
5. whether conflicts exist between any of the environmental review 
statutes and, if so, how such conflicts are to be resolved. 
These are all critical questions for which answers must be forthcoming. 
The questions focus upon the relationship between NEPA and the 
independent environmental review statutes. In one sense the issue can be 
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framed in terms of administrative reform- can NEPA serve to satisfy all 
federal environmental obligations? But a greater substantive question 
remains: do the independent statutes provide a degree of sensitivity and 
protection to specialized environmental interests that is not achieved in the 
NEPA environmental impact statement process? With the trend in cases 
indicating increasing judicial willingness to find independent standards for 
agency decision-making the answer to this question is to be answered in the 
affirmative. If this pattern continues to develop and if the basic legislative 
framework remains unaltered, agency conduct will be measured by multiple 
standards of performance. This state of affairs is the anticipated result of 
uncoordinated legislative activity on the part of Congress. Whether this trend 
will ultimately act to the benefit of environmental quality remains to be seen. 
It will undoubtedly place considerable stress upon the agencies' ability to 
comply with diverse requirements. 
C. Duplication of Requirements and 
Division of Responsibility 
Compliance with all of the federal environmental review requirements 
applicable to a given federal activity usually involves a mass of paper, 
sometimes lengthy administrative delays and general red tape. This is caused 
in part by an unnecessary duplication of procedures and also by a division of 
responsibility. One set of documents must be prepared to comply with one 
statute or requirement, and another set containing much of the same 
information, to comply with another statutory requirement. In addition, 
responsibilities for requirements affecting a single, general area of the 
environment, such as wildlife, are often shared by different agencies or even 
different offices within the same agency. 
To the extent that the law allows, or can be made to allow, responsibility 
for administering environmental review requirements should be consolidated 
in a single federal agency. When this is not possible, the number of agencies 
involved should be kept to a minimum. A concerted effort should also be 
made to reduce the number of separate documents that must be prepared and 
the number of consultations that need to be made to satisfy the review 
requirements. These modifications of procedure could improve the effi-
ciency and quality of agency decision-making. 
D. Resource Requirements 
Adequate and continued funding should be made available to all 
environmental review programs enacted by Congress. Those that Congress 
does not want to fund should be repealed. Under-funded review programs 
can do more harm than good to the goal of environmental protection. Review 
agencies without adequate manpower and technical expertise often produce 
paperwork burdens for federal project agencies with little beneficial impact 
on the environment. Often these agencies and their review procedures are 
perceived as mere procedural obstacles to federal projects. The procedures 
having been complied with, the proposed federal activity is implemented in 
basically the same fashion as originally planned. Because of resource 
limitations, the reviewing agency can often make only perfunctory comments 
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on the federal project and can take few steps to enforce any substantive 
requirements found in the review statute. This latter responsibility is often left 
to environmental organizations and other public interest groups through 
litigation, a very inefficient way to implement environmental requirements 
intended to shape early project planning. 
Environmental review requirements are increasingly viewed in some 
quarters as burdensome exercises designed to appease "little old ladies in 
green sneakers" with little real importance to the environment. This attitude is 
promoted in part by the failure of the federal government to come to grips 
with problems of the type discussed above. The perceived emphasis of 
procedure over substance and paperwork over real environmental protection 
threatens to produce an environmental backlash of serious proportions. The 
backlash will undoubtedly be felt in Congress where it may well result in 
drastic amendments which could severely limit the environmental and plan-
ning benefits that these environmental review statutes provide. Positive 
administrative reforms designed to streamline the environmental review 
process without sacrificing the protection afforded by current statutes are by 
far the preferable alternative. Without a prompt administrative response, 
many of the accomplishments of the last decade could be lost. 
